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Abstract
Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the insti-
tutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy
or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-
diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by
groups benefitting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans
rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief ex-
ecutive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique,
constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the
demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups’ voting decisions are in-
fluenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The re-
sults also highlights the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-
diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmenta-
tion adversely impacts economic development.
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The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: 
A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
ne of the most significant advances in the economics literature during the past few decades 
has been to place political and economic institutions at center stage in explaining why some 
nations are rich while others are poor. The pioneering work of North (1981), North and Thomas 
(1973), North and Weingast (1989), and Olson (1965, 1982), among others, emphasizes the 
importance of secure property rights, contract enforcement and the quality of governance in 
providing the proper incentives for capital accumulation and economic growth. More recent studies 
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2005) 
suggest that sustainable economic progress requires institutional constraints on the authority of the 
chief executive – or what Powellson (1994) calls diffusion of power. Acemoglu and his colleagues 
provide evidence showing that concentrating power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition erects a 
barrier on the path to prosperity (see also Olson 1993, 1997). Leveraging power-sharing reforms is 
therefore crucial to economic development. Moreover, the extent of power diffusion varies across 
countries and depends in part on the capacity of marginalized groups to influence institutional 
change (Powellson 1994). 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) also suggest that while institutional redesign, 
including reforms that constrain the chief executive’s authority, is beneficial to society in general, it 
will be resisted by groups that stand to lose economic rents or political power. Groups differ in their 
preferences for institutional change, and in a society where power is not shared widely, those 
benefiting from the status quo have strong incentives to defend it. We test this theory using voting 
data from Kenya’s 2005 constitutional referendum. Kenya is a typical African country and although 
it has escaped the military rule and civil war that plague the continent, political authority is 
O 
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concentrated to a high degree in the hands of the nation’s chief executive. For many years, Kenyans 
agitated for constitutional change that would lessen that branch’s power, but then-President Daniel 
Arap Moi’s regime thwarted the process and blocked the timely adoption of a more democratic 
constitution. 
In December 2002, Kenyans elected a coalition government headed by President Mwai 
Kibaki, bringing to an end 40 years of rule by the Kenya African National Union (KANU), a party 
that had dominated politics since independence. The rejection of KANU was the culmination of 
many years of frustration with leadership characterized by nepotism, corruption, poor economic 
management and widespread violations of human rights. Misrule under the KANU regime has been 
attributed to a national constitution that confers too much power on the presidency as well as to the 
almost complete absence of power separation between the executive, judicial and legislative 
branches of government. Presidents Moi and Jomo Kenyatta before him used their executive 
powers to marginalize some ethnic groups and to redistribute the country’s resources to reward their 
political supporters, thereby exacerbating regional and ethnic disparities and also undermining 
investment incentives (see, for example, Odhiambo 2004). To demonstrate his commitment to 
advancing democracy in the country, in his inaugural address President Kibaki pledged that a new 
constitution would be completed within 100 days. 
In the event, the process of constitutional reform took much longer than promised; a draft 
was not completed until late 2005. The delay in finalizing the document’s language grew out of what 
were referred to as “contentious” issues that revolved around the distribution of power between the 
chief executive and the national legislature. The new constitution was submitted to Kenya’s voters 
for ratification in a national referendum held during November 2005. It was rejected by a landslide 
of “No” votes. The principal reason for defeat, in the eyes of its opponents, was that the proposed 
constitution, much like the one it was meant to replace, endowed the executive branch with 
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excessive political authority. The majority of voters instead favored a system in which substantial 
power would be devolved to the national legislature, with a prime minister serving as head of 
government. Thus, the proposed constitution’s failure to deal with the most salient political issue – 
constraining executive power – was the proximate cause of its overwhelming rejection. 
Although the proposed Kenyan constitution was defeated soundly nationwide, the numbers 
of votes cast for and against it varied considerably across the country. The diverse voting patterns 
observed in Kenya’s 210 parliamentary constituencies suggest differences in the perceived benefits 
and costs associated with approval or disapproval of the new constitution. Voting data from the 
constitutional referendum and the availability of reasonably good information on the economic and 
demographic characteristics of voting jurisdictions supply a rare opportunity to evaluate the demand 
for power diffusion in a developing country setting. Adopting a rational choice framework, we 
present empirical results that are consistent with the theoretical prediction that power diffusion will 
be opposed by those who benefit from the concentration of power. Our findings also point to the 
conclusion that ethnicity is a barrier to power diffusion; we are thus able to identify a channel 
through which ethnic fragmentation negatively impacts economic growth, namely, by slowing the 
power diffusion process. Section II provides an overview of the November 2005 Kenyan vote and 
places it in the context of a simple model of constitutional choice. Section III presents the empirical 
model and results; section IV concludes. 
 
2. The Demand for Power Diffusion through Constitutional Choice 
Popular referendums, sometimes referred to as direct democracy, are being used with increasing 
frequency around the globe to decide important public policy issues (Deacon and Shapiro 1975; 
Matsusaka 1992, 2006; Butler and Austin 1994; Fidrmuc 1998; Coate and Conlin 2004), including 
whether or not to approve national constitutions and to make choices about regional political and 
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economic integration (Clarke and Kornberg 1994; Remmer and Gelineau 2003; Vlachos 2005). 
Developing countries undergoing democratic transitions have not been immune to this trend. In 
November 2005, Kenyans voted in a constitutional referendum asking them to accept or reject a 
proposed constitution which, if approved by the majority of the voters, would have replaced the 
current constitution. To provide background for our analysis of the factors that influenced Kenyans 
to vote decisively in favor of the status quo, we start by looking at the regional and ethnic patterns 
of voting on the constitutional referendum. 
2.1. Voting Patterns 
Kenya is divided into eight main administrative regions, known as provinces (Figure 1), which are in 
turn divided into 70 subunits called districts. Except for the fairly heterogeneous Nairobi Province,1 
site of the national capital and the country’s most populous urban area, the other provinces are 
dominated by particular ethnic groups and while not entirely homogenous, comprise people closely 
related in terms of language and customs. The 70 districts exhibit greater homogeneity in terms of 
ethnicity, population characteristics and economic activities. Representation in the national 
parliament is based on constituencies, which are components of the districts. There are presently 
210 parliamentary constituencies; these subunits tend to be much more ethnically homogeneous 
than either the districts or provinces. 
Table 1 provides summary information on the results of the constitutional referendum for 
Kenya as a whole, its eight provinces, 70 districts and principal ethnic groupings. As can be seen, 
there is considerable variation in the percentages of votes cast in favor of the new constitution. 
While 38% of the voters approved it nationwide, 93.28% voted “Yes” in the Central Province, but 
only 15.04% did so in Nyanza Province. A similarly wide variation in voter support is observed at 
the district level, ranging from 98.39% in Nyeri to only 0.68% in Rachuonyo. Differences in the 
                                                 
1 Nairobi Province is not sub-divided into districts. That is, there is only one district also known as Nairobi. 
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level of support for the new constitution also are evident across ethnic groups: 93.28% of the 
Kikuyus favored it, for example, compared with only 1.43% of the Luos. 
Large differences in the percentages of voters who turned out for the constitutional 
referendum likewise are apparent in the data summarized in Table 1. Turnout nationally was nearly 
60%, but it was only 27.26% in North Eastern Province. The highest voter turnout rate (71.86%) 
occurred in the Rift Valley Province. Voter turnout across the districts ranged from a low of 24.7% 
in Mandera, to a high of 84% in Migori. Among Kenya’s main ethnic groups, turnout was highest 
for the Kikuyus (72.18%) and lowest for the Mji Kenda (40.48%).2 The last column in Table 1 
shows the percentages of votes cast for Mwai Kibaki in the 2002 presidential election. Because he 
ran for office pledging constitutional reform, but later reneged, our empirical analysis asks whether 
the outcome of the constitutional referendum can be explained in part by the earlier vote. Did 
President Kibaki’s supporters rally behind the new constitution he offered to the country? Or did 
they instead vote against it in retaliation for breaking his promise to cede executive power? 
Overall, the results of the 2005 referendum suggest that regionalism and ethnicity may be 
important in explaining constitutional choice in Kenya. The wide variation observed in the 
percentages of votes cast for and against the proposed constitution points to large differences in the 
demand for institutional change across regions and ethnic groups. We test whether regionalism and 
ethnicity are significant determinants of voter choice once we control for other factors, including 
support for President Kibaki in 2002. 
2.2. Models of Constitutional Choice 
Exit polls confirm that the issue of power diffusion was decisive in determining the outcome of 
Kenya’s constitutional referendum. The majority of the Kenyans who voted against the proposed 
                                                 
2 Voter turnout rates vary because of differences in the cost of voting (e.g., distances to polling stations, weather on 
Election Day, and the effectiveness of efforts to “get out the vote”). Our study does not attempt to explain why the 
percentages of Kenyans who went to the polls in November 2005 differed so greatly across provinces, districts and 
ethnic groups. 
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constitution said that they did so because, just as in the document it would have replaced, undue 
political power was vested in the presidency. Its adoption was therefore unlikely to produce gains for 
groups that had been marginalized under the status quo. Thus, those who voted “No” were 
expressing a demand for power diffusion while those who supported the new constitution preferred 
a system that kept power in the hands of the nation’s chief executive. 
Although concentration of power in the executive branch of government was the most 
debated issue in the run-up to the constitutional referendum (and its salience is supported by the exit 
polling data), from a constitutional economics perspective the proposed constitution had other 
serious flaws. It included, for example, guarantees of so-called economic rights. The inclusion of 
guarantees that could not be enforced or perhaps even achieved may have been perceived as 
evidence that the proposed constitution would not impose effective constraints on the central 
government (Kimenyi 2006). However, neither the opponents nor the supporters of the draft 
constitution debated its “economic rights” aspects. 
Our empirical model accordingly is based on the assumption that voting on the 
constitutional referendum was determined in large part by differences in the demand for power 
diffusion. In other words, we interpret the data presented in Table 1 as reflecting differences in the 
expected gains and losses associated with adoption or rejection of the constitution across the various 
groups and regions. 
The analysis herein thus has much in common with Beard’s ([1913] 1986) seminal study of 
the economic forces that shaped the U.S. Constitution. He contended that the document crafted at 
Philadelphia took the form it did – and ultimately was ratified – because the interests of merchants, 
creditors and advocates of “sound” money prevailed over those of farmer-debtors and supporters of 
cheap paper money. Although Beard’s conclusions have been disputed by historians, recent work 
has restored credibility to his economic interpretation, but also suggests that the interests at play 
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were more varied and more nuanced than originally thought (McGuire and Ohsfeldt 1986, 1989, 
1997; McGuire 1988, 2003).3 Consistent with the modern evidence, we see voting on the proposed 
Kenyan constitution as being determined primarily by its anticipated effects on Kenyans’ economic 
wellbeing. The regions and ethnic groups that benefited from a constitution that concentrated power 
in the presidency would therefore have tended to vote “Yes” in order to preserve their previous 
gains. On the other hand, those who had been left behind under the status quo would have tended 
either to abstain or to vote “No” because they expected to continue to be marginalized if the 
proposed constitution was ratified. 
In a pluralistic society ruled by a strong chief executive not obliged to share much power 
with the other branches of government, the groups that prosper are those on which the ruler relies 
for political support. The members of the supporting coalition are first in line for patronage 
positions and for government-financed economic development initiatives, such as roads, schools, 
water-distribution systems and other infrastructure. Cabinet posts in the Kenyan government are 
dominated by the president’s own ethnic group, which serves as the linchpin of his power base 
(Kimenyi and Shughart 1989). Economic wellbeing is thus linked closely to partisanship and 
ethnicity. 
Ethnicity supplies a natural basis for group formation (Landa 1994).4 Ethnic identities 
frequently are readily ascertainable, thus lowering the cost of distinguishing insiders from outsiders. 
Shared behavioral norms and repeated interaction facilitate the development of stable trading 
                                                 
3 Also see Landes and Posner (1975), who view the U.S. Constitution as a means of transferring wealth to any group 
powerful enough to have influenced its design or subsequently to succeed in amending it. Mueller (1997) summarizes the 
relevant literature. 
4 Individuals identify with a group for many reasons, but one key factor is that the members of a group are by definition 
participating in a positive-sum game. Cooperation yields benefits in excess of costs which are shared according to some 
rule. In interacting with other groups, however, the game frequently is zero-sum: one group’s gains are secured at other 
groups’ expense. This is especially true when it comes to capturing control of governmental institutions, which are 
important sources of artificially created scarcity rents. The availability of rents promotes the formation of special-interest 
groups that compete for access to them (Buchanan 1980). Conflict often is unavoidable because the group that seizes 
power distributes the rents among it own members and rarely compensates the losers (Hardin 1995). 
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networks and credit markets. The ability to distinguish and recognize individuals, to reward good 
behavior and to punish bad, promotes reputation-building, which lowers transaction costs by 
helping control free-riding (Gifford 2004). Moreover, the imperatives of evolutionary biology – 
survival and reproduction – make it rational for individuals to value the wellbeing of even remote 
kin over the genetically distinct members of unrelated groups: under the right conditions, the selfish 
gene can also be a reciprocal altruist (Dawkins 1976). 
Ethnicity is vulnerable to exploitation, however. Emphasizing differences and fabricating 
ethnic tensions nurses the grievances of groups on the margins of social and economic life. Glaeser 
(2005), for example, presents a model where political entrepreneurs foment hatred of other ethnic 
groups to build solidarity and organize mass action, including the use of deadly force, to advance 
their own agendas. Indeed, by posing a credible threat to the existing “government’s monopoly 
power over determination of the distribution of rents” (Kirk 1983), domestic violence directed at 
other ethnic groups can be a strategic choice for capturing power. 
But ethnic diversity does not inevitably produce hostility and civil strife. Collier (2000a), for 
example, finds that very ethnically heterogeneous countries tend to have lower levels of conflict than 
those where one ethnic group dominates other minorities.5 As a matter of fact, the existing literature 
concludes that ethnic Balkanization leads to discord and economic stagnation only when “excessive” 
in-group identification (Sen 2006) is combined with poor institutions of governance. In the context 
of Africa, Easterly (2000) suggests that good institutions – economic liberties and political rights –
can overcome the negative effects of ethnic rivalry by enabling the sharing of political power and 
facilitating inter-group cooperation, hence muting tensions and promoting economic progress.6 
                                                 
5 Specifically, in societies where one ethnic group comprises 45–90% of the population there is a 28% chance of civil 
conflict. However, when ethnic groups are more evenly distributed the probability of conflict falls to 3%. 
6 Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2006) report evidence that economic liberties, such as enforcement of contracts, are 
more important than political rights in reducing the likelihood that an ethnically diverse country will become a staging 
ground for transnational terrorism. 
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Our economic interpretation of Kenya’s constitutional referendum is buttressed by 
unconfirmed reports that politicians and businesspeople invested heavily to influence the outcome. 
Both opponents and supporters of the draft constitution are said to have spent generously to 
promote their points of view and to turn out the vote on Election Day. We do not have access to 
detailed information on the sources and uses of these funds, but Table 2 suggests that these efforts 
varied considerably in effectiveness. The percentage of Kenyans voting “Yes” is positively and 
significantly correlated with voter turnout rates in two provinces: Coast and East. The correlation is 
negative and significantly different from zero in the Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces. Among 
Kenya’s main ethnic groups, the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposed constitution is 
positive and significant for the Gikuyu, Embus and Merus (“GEMA”) and for the Mji Kendas; it is 
negative and significant for the Luos and the Kalenjins.7 
In addition to indicating differences both in the effectiveness of campaign spending on voter 
turnout and in the perceived regional and ethnic impact of constitutional change, the data in Table 2 
also help answer an important background question: if the new constitution would have maintained 
the status quo in terms of presidential power, why did its opponents bother to vote? Given that 
voters who had been marginalized under the existing constitution plausibly could expect the same 
treatment under the new one, choosing to stay home on Election Day would allow them to avoid 
the cost of voting on an issue with no apparent instrumental consequences. Abstention evidently 
was not an option for large numbers of Luos and Kalenjins, however. Turnout among those two 
groups as well as in the Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces more generally was driven largely by 
                                                 
7 We also calculated correlations between the percentage of Kenyans voting “Yes” in the constitutional referendum and 
voter turnout rates at the district level. Generally speaking, however, the number of voting constituencies per district is 
too small to produce meaningful results. We nevertheless found positive and significant correlations in the Nyeri (r2 = 
0.986, p = 0.002), Kiambu (r2 = 0.900, p = 0.037), and Kakamega (r2 = 0.924, p = 0.076) districts; the correlations were 
negative and significant in Meru North (r2 = –0.986, p = 0.057), West Pokot (r2 = –1.000, p = 0.006), Trans Nzoia (r2 = 
–0.994, p = 0.067), Baringo (r2 = –1.000, p = 0.007) and Nyando (r2 = –0.992, p = 0.079). The Nyeri and Kiambu 
districts are located in the Central Province; Kakamega is in the Western. Meru North is one of the districts in the East 
Province; West Pokot, Trans Nzoia and Baringo are all in the Rift Valley; and Nyando is in Nyanza Province. 
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people who went to the polls to vote “No,” suggesting that at least some voting decisions had an 
expressive component, perhaps motivated by objections to a document that failed to fulfill President 
Kibaki’s campaign promise. Alternatively, Kenyans voting “No” on the proposed constitutions may 
have done so because they expected its defeat to raise the probability of another constitution being 
drafted that would impose more constraints on presidential power. Such an interpretation is a matter 
of pure speculation, however, and one on which post-independence Kenyan history casts some 
doubt. 
 
3. Empirical Model and Results 
Our empirical model is designed to explain voting behavior in Kenya’s November 2005 
constitutional referendum. The basic unit of observation is the voting constituency which, as noted 
at the outset, number 210. In addition to measures of local economic conditions and of the extent to 
which constituencies have gained access to socially provided goods, we expect voting to have been 
influenced by partisan attributes of a constituency’s political representatives which potentially are 
associated with the extent to which voters gain or lose from power concentration. The recent 
literature shows that ethnic diversity is an important determinant of economic development 
outcomes (Alesina et al. 1999; Easterly and Levine 1997; Collier 2000b). Ethnic diversity matters 
because tension between groups lowers the capacity to leverage institutional change, especially so 
when political power is concentrated and society is fragmented along racial, linguistic or religious 
lines. In other words, ethnic diversity increases the costs of cooperation against a ruling coalition. 
We therefore expect the members of Kenya’s different ethnic groups to oppose or support 
constitutional change depending on the perceived benefits and costs to their group. 
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3.1. Estimation Strategy 
We specify a regression model of the determinants of voting in the constitutional referendum as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
Ln
1
Ln ,
1
PVY ECONOMY SOCIAL PROVISION REPRESENTATIVE
PVY
KIBAKI REGION ETHNICITY
KIBAKI
α β β β
β β β µ
 
= + + + 
− 
 
+ + + + 
− 
 
where 
PVY    = Percentage voting “YES” (Constituency, 2005); 
ECONOMY 
Poverty  = Poverty rate (District, 1997); 
Unemployment = Rate of unemployment (District, 2000); 
SOCIAL PROVISION 
Piped Water  = Percentage of households with piped water (District, 2000); 
Secondary School = Gross enrollment rate in secondary schools (District, 
2003); 
REPRESENATIVE 
Cabinet = Representative is Minister or Assistant Minister 
(Constituency, 2005); 
 
Opposition = Representative is a member of an opposition party 
(Constituency, 2005); 
 
KIBAKI  = Percentage of votes cast for Mwai Kibaki in the 2002 
general election (Constituency, 2002);  
 
REGION   = Main administrative divisions (Provinces, 2005); 
ETHNICITY 
  
 Ethnic Group = Dominant ethnic group (Constituency, 2005);  
 
 Ethnic Share = National population share of a constituency’s dominant 
ethnic group (Constituency 2005); and 
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µ    = error term. 
Although our primary interest is in explaining the results of Kenya’s constitutional 
referendum, the determinants of individuals’ decisions to go to the polls at all likewise must be taken 
into account. Voting is a two-step process, after all: Ballots were marked in November 2005 only by 
those Kenyans who judged the benefits of voting for or against the proposed constitution to be 
greater than the costs. We therefore also specify a model of voter turnout and, since the errors from 
that model are in fact correlated with the errors from estimating the log-odds of voting “Yes”, we 
estimate the two equations jointly, treating them as seemingly unrelated regressions. We report the 
results of a representative turnout model in the Appendix.8 
As stated previously, the draft constitution was rejected by majority of Kenya’s voters 
primarily because it did not auger genuine change as far as concentration of power in the executive 
branch of government was concerned. Voting “No” in the referendum can therefore be interpreted 
as a vote for change while “Yes” means being resistant to change and preferring the status quo. Our 
dependent variable is defined as the log-odds of a constituency voting to ratify the new constitution. 
Economic wellbeing is proxied by poverty and unemployment rates. If we take it that 
economic status in a constituency reflects the cumulative effects of past policies, then higher poverty 
and unemployment rates would associate with lower probabilities of approving the proposed 
constitution if voters did not think it offered the prospect of substantial improvement in their 
economic circumstances. Likewise, the quality of public goods provision, as captured by the 
proportion of households with piped water and gross secondary school enrollment rates, should 
associate with higher probabilities of approving the new constitution if voters thought that its 
adoption would not erode their already comparatively advantageous positions. On the other hand, 
                                                 
8
 Our estimation strategy thus follows one suggested by Deacon and Shapiro (1975). However, because we define 
our dependent variable as the log-odds of voting “Yes”, rather than adopting their logit specification, we cannot, as 
Deacon and Shapiro do, easily recover parameters from voters’ utility functions. 
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where social provision is poor, we expect voters to have been more likely to oppose the adoption of 
a constitution that did not differ radically from the existing one. 
Constituencies represented by members of the cabinet are expected to have supported the 
proposed constitution, while those whose representatives were affiliated with parties in opposition 
to President Kibaki’s coalition government were more likely to vote against it. Being represented by 
a cabinet member increases the probability of constituents benefiting from the concentration of 
power in the executive branch; constituencies represented by members of the opposition parties are 
likely to benefit less. The log-odds of voting for President Kibaki in the 2002 general election is 
included to capture the value assigned by his supporters and opponents to the constitutional 
referendum’s outcome. Were Kibaki’s partisans more likely to support the constitution drafted by 
his government because they benefited from having political power concentrated in his hands? Or 
were they more likely to vote “No” in retaliation for his broken presidential campaign promise? 
REGION and ETHNICITY control for geographic and ethnic fixed effects. 
3.2. Data 
The preferred unit of analysis is the constituency (210 observations) for which we have good data on 
voter choice (“Yes” or “No”), electoral support for President Kibaki in 2002, the identities of 
dominant ethnic groups and the characteristics of constituencies’ political representatives (whether 
holding a cabinet post or member of an opposition party). However, the most reliable data for 
measuring local economic conditions (unemployment and poverty rates) and the level of public 
goods provision (households with piped water and gross secondary school enrollment rates) are 
available only at the district level (70 observations). We therefore construct district averages for 
these variables. Although this introduces some noise, constituencies within the same district are 
fairly similar and we do not expect serious biases. It is also true that observations on these variables 
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are not available for 2005, when voting in the referendum took place, but are available only for 
various years between 1997 and 2003. 
The choice of explanatory variables is largely influenced by data availability and also their 
perceived importance to voters. During the preparation of governmental planning documents, such 
as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2000) and the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation (2003), consultations were held across Kenya to gather information about 
citizens’ economic development priorities. As can be expected, these priorities varied regionally. 
Nevertheless, education (primary and secondary) and infrastructure (roads and water) were at or 
near the top of the list nationwide. 
Enrollments in primary schools represent a potentially good constituency-level measure of 
public goods provision. However, a policy of free (and largely compulsory) primary education was 
introduced in 2003, thereby muting the variation in enrollment rates across constituencies and 
reducing its usefulness as a measure of cross-sectional differences in educational access. Data on 
roads are rather poor and although information on road density is available, it is not possible to 
gauge differences in quality. The proportion of households with piped water is easier to measure and 
also captures variations in the supply of what may be referred to as a “patronage” good whose 
benefits accrue only to a limited number of groups as opposed to other public goods which are 
more broadly available (Alesina et al. 1999). As will be shown later, piped water is also a good 
indicator of the level of infrastructure provision generally. 
No constituency is inhabited exclusively by a single ethnic group but most constituencies are 
dominated by a particular group. ETHNICITY is defined herein in two ways. First, we identify the 
dominant ethnic group in a constituency. Second, we define ethnic share as the national population 
percentage of the largest ethnic group in a particular constituency. Although there are more than 30 
ethnic groups in Kenya, many are fairly small and in this study we focus only on the most prominent 
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groups which include the Gikuyu (Kikuyu), Embu, Meru, Luhya, Luo, Kamba, Kalenjin, Kisii, and 
Mji Kenda.9 The first three of these – commonly refereed to as “GEMA” – have strong ties, exhibit 
similar voting patterns and for all practical purposes are considered to be one ethnic group.10 
GEMA is treated as such in this paper. Mji Kenda is actually a general term for several small, closely 
related ethnic groups in the Coast Province. Although not entirely homogenous, the voting patterns 
of the groups belonging to Mji Kenda are fairly uniform. The cities of Nairobi and Mombasa are, in 
contrast, fairly ethnically heterogeneous and we are not able to assign particular ethnic groups to 
constituencies in those towns. This is also true for the North Eastern Province, which is inhabited 
by many small groups (most living a nomadic lifestyle) and data are not available to identify the 
dominant groups in these areas accurately at the constituency level; ETHNICITY is coded as 
“Other” in these cases.11 
In testing for the impact of ethnicity on constitutional choice, we assume that a group’s 
political influence is positively correlated with its size, i.e., the larger the group, the greater is its 
potential for monopolizing power. Although no single ethnic group controls a majority of the votes, 
larger groups have a comparative advantage in forging political coalitions. Put simply, larger ethnic 
groups are more likely to monopolize power and we therefore expect relative size to influence 
constitutional choice. That choice would in turn depend on a group’s success in capturing power 
under the status quo. 
Information is available on the population shares of the various ethnic groups nationally as 
follows: GEMA (28%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Mji 
                                                 
9 Based on data reported recently by Alesina et al. (2003, p. 186), Kenya exhibits the third-highest degree of ethnic 
fragmentation in the world. As of 2001, its index of ethnic fractionalization stood at 0.8588; only Liberia (0.9084) and 
Uganda (0.9302) rank higher. 
10 GEMA is an acronym for the now defunct Gikuyu-Embu-Meru Association, a voluntary tribal association that had 
extensive business interests and substantial political influence especially during President Kenyatta’s era. 
11 In fact, many ethnic groups are not perfectly homogenous. They are instead conglomerations of many clans that 
consider themselves distinctive. The group we refer to as Luhya, for example, is quite fragmented and its different 
subgroups often exhibit divergent voting patterns. 
 16 
Kenda (5%) and other (1%). For each of the constituencies, we establish the dominant ethnic group 
and assign ethnic shares accordingly. Thus, if GEMA is the dominant ethnic group in constituency 
C-1, we assign this constituency an ethnic share of 0.28. If, on the other hand, the Luo dominate in 
constituency C-2, then we assign an ethnic share of 0.13 to C-2. Note that ethnic shares are based on 
total national population and not on an ethnic group’s share of the population in a particular 
constituency. ETHNIC SHARE is generated by interacting indicator variables denoting each of 
Kenya’s principal ethnic groups with the relevant group’s national population share. The underlying 
assumption is that the voters in each of the constituencies know the relative size of their own group 
nationally and thus know the probability of capturing power. Given that it continued to centralize 
power in the executive branch of the Kenyan government, the larger a group’s ethnic share, the 
higher is its probability of supporting the proposed constitution since the benefits of capturing 
political power are greater (and the costs of doing so are lower) when it is concentrated than when it 
is diffuse. 
Voting data (General Election 2002 and Referendum 2005) are as officially reported by the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), published in local newspapers (Daily Nation and The East 
African Standard).12 All other data are taken from reports produced by the Government of Kenya’s 
Central Bureau of Statistics, including the Welfare Monitoring Survey, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 
and the Economic Survey. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation. 
3.3. Results and Analysis 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of estimating various specifications of our general model of the 
determinants of the log-odds of voting in favor of the proposed constitution, estimated jointly with 
the turnout model described in the Appendix and treating the two as seemingly unrelated 
regressions. Both tables include measures of local economic conditions (the poverty rate and the 
                                                 
12 Daily Nation: www.nationmedia.com; East Africa Standard: www.eastandard.net. 
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unemployment rate), indicators of public goods provision (share of households with piped water 
and secondary school enrollment rates) and our other controls, such as representative characteristics 
(whether a constituency’s representative is a member of the cabinet or belongs to an opposition 
party), the log-odds of supporting President Kibaki in the 2002 general election, which captures how 
strongly voters felt about his promise to devolve power, and also regional fixed effects.  Table 5 also 
controls for ethnic groups. For the estimations presented there, the Central Province is the excluded 
region and GEMA is the excluded ethnic group. Voters in the Central Province and those belonging 
to the GEMA group overwhelmingly supported the new constitution. 
The results are largely consistent in most of the specifications shown in Table 4. Both 
measures of the state of the local economy – unemployment and poverty rates – are associated with 
smaller odds of supporting the proposed constitution. The results suggest that voters are concerned 
about their current economic status when voting on constitutional change. The fact that voters 
living in areas that are more economically depressed, as evidenced by high poverty and 
unemployment rates, exhibit greater opposition to the new constitution suggests that they did not 
see much prospect for relief in it. In other words, if voters attribute their economic distress to 
weaknesses in a constitution, they will reject proposed changes if they do not entail significant 
reforms. However, poverty and unemployment rates generally are not statistically significant when 
ethnicity is controlled for (Table 5). This latter result likely follows from the fact that economic 
conditions vary systematically by ethnic groups as a result of their spatial concentration. Forty-seven 
percent of Kenyans live above the poverty line, on the average, but the figure is 65% in the Central 
Province, the ancestral homeland of the Kikuyus. In the Rift Valley, by contrast, where the Kalenjin 
are the dominant ethnic group, 56% of the population lives below the poverty line (Childress 2008). 
We enter the proportion of households with piped water and gross secondary school 
enrollments as measures of public goods provision. As noted previously, access to both water and 
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education is highly valued throughout the country and voters are likely to make decisions about 
supporting or opposing the proposed constitution depending on how well they have been served 
under the existing one. Although secondary school enrollments do capture some differences across 
districts, education provision in Kenya is such that sizeable numbers of students study outside their 
home districts and thus enrollments are not a good indicator of public goods provision to specific 
groups and regions. Even so, the variation in enrollments could be influenced by a particular 
region’s ability to pay. 
We consider piped water to be the most salient proxy for the level of public goods 
provision. First, its benefits are concentrated in particular communities; hence, piped water is a good 
indicator of the benefits of patronage that flow from the concentration of political power. Second, 
simple data analysis reveals that the percentage of households with piped water is highly correlated 
with the presence of other infrastructure, such as electricity and telephone density: areas that have 
piped water are also likely to have access to additional socially provided goods.13 The different levels 
of social provision across the country can be attributed primarily to governmental discrimination in 
the allocation of public resources, which is possible owing to the concentration of political power in 
the executive branch. Hence, voters in regions that have been shortchanged by past governments in 
terms of social provision would only support a new constitution if it promises to curtail the powers 
of the presidency substantially. 
With the exception of secondary school enrollment rates in model 5, the signs on the 
coefficients for these variables are as hypothesized. The proportion of households with piped water 
is positive and significant in all specifications. Given the high correlation between this variable and 
other types of infrastructure, the results imply that access to public goods is an important 
                                                 
13 It is of course possible that high income regions are well served with infrastructure because of effective demand 
(people still have to pay for services). It is nevertheless true that the services are provided by the government and, hence, 
their allocation is politically determined. 
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determinant of constitutional choice. While, access to piped water loses explanatory power when 
ethnicity is taken into account, the overall results point to the conclusion that voters who have 
benefited from the concentration of political power were significantly more likely to support a 
constitution that preserved the status quo. 
Being represented by a member of President Kibaki’s cabinet raised the odds of voting for 
the proposed constitution, although not significantly so in most specifications. Being represented by 
a member of an opposition party as a rule reduced the likelihood of such support. Again, however, 
the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero as a rule. The interpretation here is 
that partisanship does not matter very much. The empirical results by and large fail to support our 
conjectures that constituencies having a strong voice in the executive branch had good reason to 
favor continuing the concentration of political power in the office of the president, while those 
which had sent members of an opposition party to Nairobi would not. 
Other things being the same, voters who backed President Kibaki in 2002 were more likely 
to cast their ballots against ratifying the new constitution he proposed in 2005. It appears that the 
breaking of his campaign promise provoked a major backlash against him personally. This finding 
suggests that many of those who supported Kibaki in 2002 did so in the expectation that, as 
president, he would cede power to the legislative branch of government. On the other hand, those 
who supported the ratification of the draft constitution expected to continue to benefit from 
Kibaki’s continued exercise of strong executive power. Given that the new constitution was defeated 
soundly, defections from the coalition that elected him to office in 2002 are equally evident. The 
perceived welfare loss to opponents from the adoption of the constitution apparently was much 
greater than the expected welfare gain by its proponents. 
The regional variables indicate that, compared to the Central Province, voters elsewhere 
generally were less supportive of the new constitution. This holds true even when ethnicity is 
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controlled for. Likewise, when the regional controls are omitted, the results show that other ethnic 
groups were more opposed to the proposed constitution than the GEMA group, which 
overwhelmingly voted “Yes.” However, when regional controls are included, only the Kalenjin and 
Kamba were significantly more likely to vote “No” (Table 5). 
The reason that the votes of some ethnic groups – specifically, the Lubya, the Luo and 
“other” – no longer differ significantly from the GEMA when we control for region is that ethnicity 
is closely tied to geography in Kenya.14 Indeed, taking spatial concentration into account helps 
explain why the estimated coefficient on Kisii switches sign in Table 5’s last column. The Kisii share 
ground with the Luos in Nyanza Province, which overall was less likely to vote to ratify the new 
constitution than was the omitted Central Province. Only 1.4% of the latter group voted for the 
proposed constitution, compared with 42% of the former (see Table 1). Including regional fixed 
effects isolates the Kisii’s comparatively greater level of support. In any case, these results indicate 
the combined importance of regionalism and ethnicity in constitutional decisions. 
The results concerning the importance of ethnicity in constitutional choice requires some 
further analysis in order to shed light on why particular ethnic groups vote the way they do. 
Capturing political power in weak states can be expected to benefit some ethnic groups at the 
expense of others. It is therefore reasonable to assume that all ethnic groups would like to 
monopolize power, giving rulers incentive to broker wealth transfers among them.15 We can 
hypothesize that the greater is an ethnic group’s potential for capturing power, the more likely it is 
that the members of that group would support a constitution that endows the executive with 
substantial powers. 
                                                 
14 The same reasoning explains why the last column of Table 5 does not include coefficient estimates for the 
Northeastern Province or for the Mij Kenda. We are unable to identify a dominant group for the Northeastern Province 
owing to the ethnic heterogeneity of that region. Similarly, the Mij Kenda are omitted from this specification because 
they are concentrated in the Coast Province. 
15 This is consistent with the ethnic rent-seeking literature as advanced by, for example, Kimenyi and Mbaku (1993) and 
Kimenyi (1998). 
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Table 6 reports the results of various specifications of the general model in which we include 
the square of the national population share of each constituency’s dominant ethnic group.16 The 
variable is positive and significant, suggesting that the demand for power concentration increases 
with the square of group size. Smaller groups, with low probabilities of successfully monopolizing 
power, seem to have a greater demand for power diffusion. 
One question we are unable to address at present is the extent to which a major Kenyan land 
reform initiative may have influenced voting on the constitutional referendum. A policy formulated 
by the land ministry in Nairobi proposed to repossess all Coast Province land owned by “absentee 
landlords”, mostly British, Arab and Kenyan politicians, and transfer title to it to squatters. Although 
President Kibaki did not begin actually seizing land by presidential decree until 2006,17 it is possible 
that the land reform issue determined at least some voters’ positions on the proposed constitution. 
It is perhaps noteworthy in that regard that our results suggest that Kenyans living in the Coast 
Province were significantly more likely to vote “No” in November 2005. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes voting in Kenya’s 2005 constitutional referendum. The proposed constitution 
was rejected overwhelmingly by the voters because it failed substantially to curtail the powers of the 
nation’s chief executive. The paper reports some empirical models of the demand for power 
diffusion. The study is unique in that it is the first of which we are aware to estimate empirically the 
determinants of constitutional choice in a developing country setting using the rational choice 
framework. The shortcomings of the data notwithstanding, the estimation results are quite robust to 
changes in model specification and provide strong support for recent theoretical advances in the 
economic development literature, spearheaded by Acemoglu and others, concerning resistance to 
                                                 
16 The ethnic group population shares are entered as whole numbers; squaring gives greater weight to larger groups. 
17 BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/5275670.stm, August 22, 2006. 
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institutional change and its implications for growth. Finally, this study identifies a channel through 
which ethnicity can hinder growth. Our results suggest that ethnic heterogeneity can impede 
development by slowing the power diffusion process. 
The ethnic divisions evident in the voting on President Kibaki’s proposed constitution 
turned violent in December 2007, after he was declared to have defeated Raila Odinga in an election 
that his supporting coalition, comprised primarily of Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjins, charged was 
marked by widespread vote fraud. More than 800 Kenyans are reported to have been killed and as 
many as 250,000 to have been displaced in the post-election attacks launched by Luos and Kalenjins 
against Kikuyu homes and businesses, primarily in the Rift Valley town of Eldoret (Childress 2008). 
It remains to be seen whether a power-sharing arrangement between Kibaki and Odinga, brokered 
by former U.N. Secretary Kofi Anan in February 2008, will hold. 
The results of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum and 2007–2008’s bloodshed point 
to the importance of designing institutions that harmonize ethnic claims in divided societies. 
Concentration of political power in such societies is often used to marginalize some groups and to 
provide patronage goods to others. An appropriate institutional change would be one that lowers 
the benefits of power concentration through constitutional decentralization. 
 
Appendix 
All results of voting in November 2005 reported in the text are obtained by jointly estimating 
seemingly unrelated regressions for the determinants of the log-odds of voting in favor of President 
Kibaki’s proposed constitution and the determinants of voting at all (turnout). We specify the voter 
turnout model as follows: 
 
= 
− 1
PV
Ln f
PV
(ECONOMY, POPDEN, AREA, CLOSE, REGION), 
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where 
PV = percentage of a constituency’s registered voters who voted in the 
 referendum (voter turnout); 
POPDEN = constituency population density; 
AREA  = geographic size of the constituency in square miles; 
CLOSENESS = closeness in the referendum voting expressed as the absolute difference 
 between “Yes” and “No” votes; and 
ECONOMY and REGION are as defined previously. Although the coefficients and standard errors 
of the turnout model vary across their jointly estimated companion specifications in Tables 4–6, we 
report a set of representative SUR results in Table A1. (We would be happy to supply the other 
estimates of the turnout model upon request.) 
The results of estimating the determinants of log-odds of voting either “Yes” or “No” are 
largely consistent with a priori expectations. According to the literature on voter participation (see 
Geys 2006 for a recent survey), greater POVERTY and higher UNEMPLOYMENT are expected to 
have a negative impact on voter turnout, and that is what we find. The log-odds of voting likewise is 
expected to be lower in areas that are densely populated and geographically large. Voter free-riding 
becomes more likely as population density increases and this tends to suppress turnout. Lower voter 
turnout rates in urban areas could also be due to city dwellers’ higher opportunity costs of time. In 
Kenya, there is clear evidence of lower turnout in urban areas as compared to rural areas and the 
results in Table A1 offer support for that conjecture. 
LAND AREA is negatively related to turnout. Constituencies that are geographically large 
raise the costs of voting because people have to travel long distances to polling places and also 
because of poor roads and communication networks in most of Kenya’s sparsely populated areas. 
Because one person’s vote is less likely to be decisive, voter turnout is expected to be lower in 
constituencies where the raw vote margin between “Yes” and “No” votes is larger. However, the 
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estimated coefficient on CLOSENESS is positive and significant, suggesting that, other things being 
the same, voter turnout rates were higher in constituencies where the constitutional referendum’s 
margin of victory or defeat was wider. This unexpected finding could be due to the important role 
played by ethnicity in explaining support or opposition to the new constitution. Indeed, the results 
suggest that, compared to the Central Province, turnout rates were significantly higher in the Rift 
Valley, a center of Kalenjin opposition to the Kikuyu-dominated Kibaki administration, but that 
they were significantly lower in the Coast and Western provinces, both of which also were more 
likely to vote “No” in November 2005. 
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Table A1. SUR Results (Dependent Variable= Log-odds of Voting in the Referendum) 
Explanatory variable Model 1 
Intercept 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
Population Density 
 
 
Area 
 
 
Closeness 
 
 
Northeastern Province 
 
 
East Province 
 
 
Coast Province 
 
 
Nyanza Province 
 
 
Western Province 
 
 
Rift Valley Province 
 
 
Nairobi Province 
 
 
1.000*** 
(5.23) 
 
–0.009** 
(–2.41) 
 
–0.047*** 
(–4.84) 
 
–0.000** 
(–2.26) 
 
–0.000*** 
(–4.67) 
 
0.008*** 
(7.74) 
 
–0.231 
(–0.94) 
 
0.041 
(0.24) 
 
–0.469** 
(–2.78) 
 
–0.152 
(–0.99) 
 
–0.430** 
(–2.56) 
 
0.506*** 
(3.80) 
 
0.134 
(0.42) 
Notes: See Table 4. The system adjusted-R2s are reported in the main text in the corresponding 
models of the determinants of the log-odds of voting “Yes”. 
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Figure 1. Kenya’s Political Boundaries 
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Table 1. Constitutional Referendum Results, November 2005 
Unit Number of 
constituencies 
Percent voting 
YES 
Referendum 
voter turnout 
Percent voting for 
President Kibaki 
in 2002 
NATIONAL 210 38.0 59.34 57.65 
PROVINCES 
1.   Nairobi 
2.   Coast 
3.   Northeast 
4.   Eastern 
5.   Central 
6.   Rift Valley 
7.   Western 
8.   Nyanza 
 
 
8 
21 
11 
36 
29 
49 
24 
32 
 
43.35 
20.65 
25.43 
47.33 
93.28 
22.92 
37.81 
15.04 
 
42.33 
41.00 
27.26 
60.20 
72.18 
71.86 
50.36 
61.57 
 
73.54 
56.49 
28.05 
65.28 
69.24 
39.09 
73.33 
62.20 
DISTRICTS 
1. Nairobi 
2. Mombassa 
3. Kwale 
4. Kilifi 
5. Malindi 
6. Tana River 
7. Lamu 
8. Taita 
9. Garissa 
10. Wajir 
11. Mandera 
12. Moyale 
13. Marasbit 
14. Isiolo 
15. Meru North 
16. Meru Central 
17. Meru South 
18. Tharaka 
19. Embu 
20. Mbeere 
21. Mwingi 
22. Kitui 
23. Machakos 
24. Makueni 
25. Nyandarua 
26. Nyeri 
27. Kirinyaga 
28. Muranga 
29. Maragwa 
30. Thika 
31. Kiambu 
32. Turkana 
33. West Pokot 
34. Samburu 
35. Trans Nzoia 
 
8 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
4 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
6 
5 
4 
6 
4 
3 
3 
4 
5 
3 
3 
2 
3 
 
43.35 
20.85 
12.41 
14.59 
11.56 
15.43 
34.67 
32.62 
12.68 
28.00 
39.00 
47.36 
26.21 
40.95 
84.06 
95.70 
94.93 
86.21 
94.59 
77.18 
14.90 
28.00 
11.71 
25.16 
96.14 
98.39 
96.96 
96.85 
97.32 
79.86 
88.12 
26.04 
4.36 
9.70 
55.15 
 
42.33 
29.92 
43.42 
37.52 
37.60 
44.25 
49.13 
48.09 
27.16 
24.71 
30.81 
42.14 
46.60 
48.32 
80.71 
68.08 
66.41 
69.39 
64.58 
58.99 
65.43 
50.36 
57.93 
59.77 
77.35 
76.53 
80.25 
70.22 
72.80 
61.05 
66.11 
31.96 
68.45 
59.55 
53.27 
 
73.54 
75.07 
55.35 
71.51 
63.88 
31.04 
30.90 
55.69 
20.36 
31.79 
33.32 
24.61 
30.34 
28.24 
60.13 
74.59 
67.50 
61.88 
79.13 
57.31 
90.39 
76.22 
76.88 
72.90 
66.99 
96.25 
88.13 
78.57 
71.35 
39.79 
40.24 
43.78 
19.22 
36.71 
64.52 
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Unit Number of 
constituencies 
Percent voting 
YES 
Referendum 
voter turnout 
Percent voting for 
President Kibaki 
in 2002 
36. Usian Gishu 
37. Marakwet 
38. Keiyo 
39. Nandi North 
40. Nandi South 
41. Baringo 
42. Koibatek 
43. Laikipia 
44. Nakuru 
45. Trans Mara 
46. Narok 
47. Kajiado 
48. Bomet 
49. Bureti 
50. Kericho 
51. Kakamega 
52. Lugari 
53. Butere Mumias 
54. Vihiga 
55. Mt. Elgon 
56. Bungoma 
57. Teso 
58. Busia 
59. Siaya 
60. Bondo 
61. Kisumu 
62. Nyando 
63. Rachuonyo 
64. Homa Bay 
65. Migori 
66. Suba 
67. Kuria 
68. Gucha 
69. Kisii 
70. Nyamira 
 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
6 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
4 
1 
4 
4 
1 
5 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
1 
3 
5 
2 
16.33 
1.69 
1.73 
6.44 
8.45 
18.61 
9.05 
83.61 
62.35 
7.00 
6.90 
29.20 
2.92 
2.92 
7.76 
38.10 
13.19 
29.60 
16.88 
22.28 
80.93 
4.89 
31.04 
1.14 
2.76 
2.48 
1.32 
0.68 
0.76 
1.01 
1.32 
31.01 
41.07 
41.26 
45.49 
74.21 
99.01 
87.43 
78.42 
76.22 
77.97 
96.16 
64.88 
65.98 
73.12 
78.33 
65.25 
84.14 
83.94 
79.54 
49.78 
31.13 
47.88 
45.72 
75.27 
51.57 
65.11 
51.44 
57.09 
70.22 
54.92 
66.79 
78.50 
72.34 
84.03 
72.79 
61.84 
44.44 
43.84 
47.85 
  
37.38 
35.82 
18.43 
41.30 
39.94 
7.76 
13.73 
78.96 
53.53 
54.73 
45.97 
61.42 
24.78 
32.54 
25.46 
76.27 
89.10 
75.89 
67.69 
26.87 
81.63 
51.89 
76.18 
90.21 
94.83 
92.25 
96.77 
95.75 
88.36 
88.63 
94.35 
16.22 
2.98 
3.96 
3.80 
 
ETHNIC GROUPS 
1. Kikuyu 
2. Embu 
3. Meru 
4. Luhya 
5. Luo 
6. Kalenjin 
7. Kamba 
8. Kisii 
9.    Mji Kenda 
 
 
 
93.28 
83.38 
90.79 
37.81 
1.43 
16.13 
19.87 
42.05 
19.09 
 
72.18 
61.83 
72.45 
50.34 
69.19 
70.78 
57.57 
44.82 
40.48 
 
75.60 
84.60 
86.70 
73.57 
85.37 
29.38 
77.14 
3.65 
56.49 
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Table 2. Correlations between Percentage Voting Yes and Voter Turnout by Region and Ethnicity 
Region or Group Coefficient Significance 
   NATIONAL  0.079 0.256 
   PROVINCES   
          Nairobi  0.449 0.265 
          Coast  0.424 0.055 
          Northeast   0.211 0.533 
          East  0.342 0.038 
          Rift Valley –0.508 0.000 
          Western –0.030 0.890 
          Nyanza –0.758 0.000 
ETHNIC GROUPS   
         GEMA  0.475 0.000 
         Luhya –0.024 0.908 
         Luo –0.607 0.001 
         Kalenjin  –0.631 0.000 
         Kamba  0.066 0.800 
         Kisii –0.422 0.224 
         Mkenda  0.424 0.055 
         Other –0.195 0.373 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statisticsa 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Percent voting “Yes” 
Poverty rate 
Unemployment rate 
Percent with piped water 
Secondary school enrollment 
Member of cabinet 
Opposition member 
Percent voting for Kibaki in 2002 
Percent voting (turnout) 
Area of the constituency 
Population density 
Closeness 
Eastern Province 
Coast Province 
Nyanza Province 
Western province 
North Eastern Province 
Nairobi Province 
Central Province 
Kikuyu-Embu-Meru 
Luhya 
Luo 
Kalenjin 
Kamba 
Kisii 
Mji Kenda 
Other 
38.00 
54.98 
9.60 
24.59 
22.02 
0.33 
0.40 
57.72 
59.23 
8731.33 
374.48 
65.37 
0.176 
0.100 
0.152 
0.114 
0.052 
0.038 
0.138 
0.21 
0.11 
0.12 
0.19 
0.08 
0.05 
0.10 
0.10 
34.29 
13.22 
4.73 
23.17 
14.78 
0.69 
0.49 
27.96 
17.91 
1483.28 
683.69 
31.37 
0.381 
0.300 
0.360 
0.318 
0.223 
0.191 
0.345 
0.41 
0.32 
0.33 
0.39 
0.27 
0.21 
0.30 
0.31 
a Note that the summary statistics shown here are based on Kenya’s 210 parliamentary constituencies. Regional and 
ethnic statistics therefore reflect shares of constituencies per province and shares of constituencies where particular 
ethnic groups are dominant, respectively. Thus the ethnic means do not correspond to national population shares. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Constitutional Choice 
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
Piped water 
 
 
Secondary school 
 
 
Cabinet 
 
 
Opposition  
 
 
Kibaki  
 
 
Northeastern Province 
 
 
East Province 
 
 
Coast Province 
 
 
Nyanza Province 
 
 
Western Province 
 
 
Rift Valley Province 
 
 
Nairobi Province 
 
 
4.286*** 
(6.16) 
 
–0.071*** 
(–6.16) 
 
–0.134*** 
(–4.18) 
 
 
0.545 
(0.62) 
 
–0.042*** 
(–3.57) 
 
–0.082** 
(–2.48) 
 
0.030*** 
(4.68) 
 
0.042*** 
(3.92) 
 
 
 
0.311 
(0.33) 
 
–0.040*** 
(–3.43) 
 
–0.069** 
(–2.07) 
 
0.0286*** 
(4.25) 
 
0.042*** 
(3.98) 
 
0.649* 
(1.76) 
 
–0.112 
(–0.38) 
0.288 
(0.31) 
 
–0.037*** 
(–3.13) 
 
–0.069* 
(–2.07) 
 
0.030*** 
(4.47) 
 
0.045*** 
(4.22) 
 
0.686* 
(1.86) 
 
–0.597 
(–1.41) 
 
–0.202 
(–1.56) 
 
 
 
 
4.014*** 
(4.99) 
 
–0.018 
(–1.42) 
 
–0.131*** 
(–4.28) 
 
0.041*** 
(6.00) 
 
 –0.011  
(–1.28) 
 
0.244 
(0.90) 
 
–0.959***  
(–2.97) 
 
–0.403*** 
(–4.06) 
 
–1.336 
(–1.61) 
 
–1.246**   
(–2.21) 
 
–3.491*** 
(–5.93) 
 
–4.551*** 
(–8.70) 
 
–2.612*** 
(–4.78) 
 
–4.040*** 
(–8.12) 
 
–5.647*** 
(–6.47) 
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.624 0.626 0.630 0.718 
Notes: Dependent variable = log odds of voting “Yes”. N = 210. t-statistics in parentheses. Asterisks denote 
significance at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*) levels. Central Province is the omitted 
region. R2 is the system-weighted coefficient of multiple determination. 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Constitutional Choice, Including Ethnic Groups 
Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
Piped Water 
 
 
Secondary School 
 
 
Cabinet 
 
 
Opposition  
 
 
Kibaki 
 
 
Northeastern Province 
 
 
East Province 
 
 
Coast Province 
 
 
Nyanza Province 
 
 
Western Province 
 
 
Rift Valley Province 
 
 
Nairobi 
 
 
Luhya 
 
 
 
2.986*** 
(6.48) 
 
–0.005 
(–0.66) 
 
–0.032 
(–1.32) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–3.074*** 
(–8.77) 
 
 
1.357* 
(1.98) 
 
 0.003 
(0.39) 
 
-0.021 
(–0.83) 
 
0.011** 
(2.41) 
 
0.023** 
(2.53) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–2.836*** 
(–8.06) 
 
 
1.185* 
(1.68) 
 
 0.004 
(0.52) 
 
–0.016 
(–0.62) 
 
0.011** 
(2.33) 
 
0.025** 
(2.70) 
 
0.178 
(0.74) 
 
–0.186 
(–0.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–2.836*** 
(–7.97) 
 
 
1.199* 
(1.69) 
 
 0.004  
(0.46) 
 
–0.015 
(–0.59) 
 
0.010** 
(2.18) 
 
0.024** 
(2.57) 
 
0,159 
(0.65) 
 
–0.132 
(–0.44) 
 
0.040 
(0.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–2.798*** 
(–7.77) 
 
 
2.395*** 
(3.78) 
 
–0.000 
(–0.03) 
 
–0.023 
(–1.05) 
 
0.010*  
(1.89) 
 
0.004  
(0.53) 
 
0.099 
(0.49) 
 
–0.214 
(–0.82) 
 
0.193* 
(1.92) 
 
 
 
 
–0.030 
(–0.08) 
 
–3.932*** 
(–10.24) 
 
–6.420*** 
(–9.43) 
 
–2.610** 
(-2.13) 
 
–1.574*** 
(-4.22) 
 
–3.421*** 
(–4.80) 
 
–0.716 
(–0.61) 
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Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Luo 
 
 
Kalenjin 
 
 
Kamba 
 
 
Kisii 
 
 
Mji Kenda 
 
 
Other ethnic 
 
 
–5.852*** 
(–16.73) 
 
–5.030*** 
(–15.81) 
 
–3.898*** 
(–8.87) 
 
–2.838*** 
(–6.10) 
 
–3.701*** 
(–9.30) 
 
–3.515*** 
(–8.27) 
 
 
–5.440*** 
(–14.93) 
 
–4.600*** 
(–13.62) 
 
–4.116*** 
(–8.41) 
 
–2.679*** 
(–5.69) 
 
–3.392*** 
(–8.46) 
 
–2.861*** 
(–6.20) 
 
 
–5.44*** 
(–14.76) 
 
–4.423*** 
(–11.37) 
 
–4.166*** 
(–8.47) 
 
–2.496*** 
(–4.88) 
 
–3.328*** 
(–8.16) 
 
–2.728*** 
(–5.57) 
 
–5.499*** 
(–13.95) 
 
–4.393*** 
(–10.99) 
 
–4.174*** 
(–8.45) 
 
–2.378*** 
(–3.82) 
 
–3.329*** 
(–8.13) 
 
–2.717*** 
(–5.50) 
 
–0.664 
(–1.12) 
 
–3.153*** 
(–6.69) 
 
–4.299*** 
(–8.90) 
 
4.410*** 
(5.03) 
 
 
 
 
–2.832 
(–6.76) 
Adjusted R2 0.731 0.738 0.739 0.742 0.794 
Notes: See Table 4; GEMA is the omitted ethnic group. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Constitutional Choice, Including Ethnic Population Shares 
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Intercept 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
Piped Water 
 
 
Secondary School 
 
 
Cabinet 
 
 
Opposition  
 
 
Kibaki 
 
 
Ethnic share squared 
 
 
Northeastern Province 
 
 
East Province 
 
 
Coast Province 
 
 
Nyanza Province 
 
 
Western Province 
 
 
Rift Valley Province 
 
 
Nairobi 
 
 
 
2.403** 
(2.41) 
 
–0.019 
(–1.53) 
 
–0.118*** 
(–3.86) 
 
0.038*** 
(5.46) 
 
–0.016* 
(–1.72) 
 
0.278 
(1.04) 
 
–0.862** 
(–2.67) 
 
–0.437*** 
(–4.43) 
 
0.551** 
(2.61) 
 
–0.447 
(–0.51) 
 
–0.903 
(–1.59) 
 
–2.839*** 
(–4.49) 
 
–4.213*** 
(–7.94) 
 
–2.339*** 
(–4.27) 
 
–3.809*** 
(–7.63) 
 
–5.411*** 
(–6.24) 
 
 
2.413** 
(2.43) 
 
–0.026* 
(–2.00) 
 
–0.125*** 
(–4.03) 
 
0.034*** 
(4.93) 
 
–0.019* 
(–2.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.236*** 
(–3.19) 
 
0.616*** 
(2.89) 
 
–0.371 
(–0.41) 
 
–0.846 
(–1.45) 
 
–2.715*** 
(–4.21) 
 
–4.183*** 
(–7.72) 
 
–2.170*** 
(–3.93) 
 
–3.8536*** 
(–7.55) 
 
–4.873*** 
(–5.64)    
 
–1.182 
(–0.94) 
 
–0.033** 
(–2.71) 
 
–0.039 
(–1.06) 
 
0.029*** 
(3.93) 
 
0.040*** 
(3.67) 
 
0.723* 
(1.96) 
 
–0.520 
(–1.22) 
 
–0.241* 
(–1.85) 
 
0.443* 
(1.71) 
 
 
–0.938 
(–0.76) 
 
–0.037*** 
(–3.04) 
 
–0.052 
(–1.41) 
 
0.028*** 
(4.05) 
 
0.037*** 
(3.39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.082 
(–0.87) 
 
0459* 
(1.77) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.722 0.636 0.634 
Notes: See Table 4. 
